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Abstract
The paper investigates alternative policies to regulate emissions from pollut-
ing product markets, specifically considering the case of the automobiles market.
The two policies we consider are: a quota that limits the quantity produced of
the polluting model and a more flexible average efficiency standard that requires
a minimum energy efficiency across all models produced by a firm, similar to
the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. We use a duopoly
model of vertical differentiation where firms produce both an economy (i.e., low
polluting) version and a luxury (i.e., high polluting) version of a given product.
We show that while a quota can raise firm profit over a certain range, CAFE al-
ways reduces firm profit relative to the pre-regulation. We also show that while
the quota reduces emissions, it is possible that emissions increase under CAFE.
The optimal policy choice will depend on the magnitude of unit damages. We
show that when unit damages are sufficiently high, the quota policy is more effi-
cient than the average efficiency standard. This suggests that instead of tightening
CAFE to limit damages from emissions, policy makers can shift to a quota policy
which is both welfare enhancing and more profitable for firms.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: Q48, Q58
Keywords: automobiles market, emission control, green markets, energy/fuel
efficiency
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I.  Introduction 
 
In many contexts environmental damages stem from the consumption of the final 
product rather than the production process.  Examples include products that consume 
large amounts of energy or water such as household appliances or automobiles.  When 
there are several possible versions of the product, regulation of the polluting product 
market aims at substituting the polluting versions with the clean ones.  Although 
alternative policies can achieve that end, their impact on firm profit as well as their 
welfare implications can be quite different. 
In this paper we consider two alternative policies to regulate polluting product 
markets.  The first policy tool is a quota policy which sets a limit on the amount produced 
of the polluting model.  The minimum efficiency standard is a special case of the quota 
policy where the amount produced of the polluting model is set equal to zero.  In 
addition, we consider an alternative more flexible policy tool: an average efficiency 
standard (AES), which is a limit on the average energy consumption across all models 
produced by a firm.  The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard for 
automobiles is an example, where the average miles per gallon across a firm’s fleet of 
automobiles has to meet a certain standard (Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, 2001).  Thus, the analysis presented here has relevant implications for the 
automobiles market, although the results apply more generally to other polluting product 
markets as well.  
 It is generally believed that the AES offers firms more flexibility in choice 
(Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 2001).  Under regulations like 
CAFE firms can meet the standard by producing more fuel efficient models or increasing 
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sales of models that are above the standard (Gayer, 2005).  Furthermore, the AES allows 
the continuation of models that would have been totally eliminated under alternative 
regulations, e.g. minimum efficiency standards (Kwoka, 1983).  Thus, the AES allows for 
a wider product variety and gives consumers more choice, which is particularly important 
in markets where the polluting models have additional features that are valued by 
consumers.  While the AES is desirable from that perspective, we show that in an 
oligopoly market, the flexibility of the AES is detrimental to firm profit as it intensifies 
competition between firms. 
We use a product line model where each firm has an exogenous menu of product 
models that differ in their energy efficiency.  Each firm chooses how much to supply of 
each model.  While most of the literature on quality choice focuses on product 
differentiation, in this case firms’ quality choices are identical, which is consistent with 
product line models where identical firms have identical quality choices.1  This is also 
consistent with empirical observation where, for example, most automobile companies 
produce both luxury and economy models.  
The product line exhibits a tradeoff between the energy efficiency of the product 
and its overall performance or quality.  In some contexts, firms can improve energy or 
water efficiency with the same or even better performance.  For example, improvements 
in energy consumption of washing machines do not negatively affect performance 
(CECED, 2002).  However, in some cases firms can produce the energy efficient 
products only by sacrificing other quality attributes of the product.  As in Plourde and 
Bardis (1999) and Chen (2001), we assume that improvement in environmental quality, 
i.e., energy efficiency in this case, negatively affects other quality attributes.  This is 
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especially true in the short run when firms do not have access to superior technologies for 
improving efficiency.  For example, in automobile production using conventional 
technologies firms usually achieve greater fuel economy by using lighter materials, which 
can negatively affect safety (Crandall, 1989; Crandall, 1992; Godek, 1997; Plourde and 
Bardis, 1999; Chen, 2001; Kleit, 2002).  Automobile manufacturers have also produced 
cleaner automobiles through downsizing, e.g., producing compact automobiles.  This 
tradeoff exists not only for automobiles but also for many other green products for which 
the environmental attributes can conflict with the product performance, e.g., recycled 
paper (Chen, 2001).2 
When there is a tradeoff between the environmental attribute and the overall 
product quality, the flexibility of an AES becomes particularly desirable from the 
consumers’ perspective.  As mentioned before, the AES would allow the higher quality 
models to exist in the market.  This provides an explanation for why automobiles were 
not covered under the Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products.  The 
Program imposes minimum efficiency standards on consumer products other than 
automobiles (Department of Energy, 2001).  If automobiles were subject to such 
standards, production of luxury and large automobiles not meeting the standard would 
have ceased and overall automobiles quality and safety would have declined. 
Given the product line structure described here, we model the firms’ short run 
response to the policy where each firm changes its product mix.  In this setting firms do 
not introduce new models to the existing product line.  This is justified based on previous 
findings that show that automobile manufacturers complied with CAFE standards mostly 
by changing the numbers they sell of the existing models rather than introducing new 
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models into the market (Greene, 1991).  The time frame of the model is similar to Kleit 
(1990), Greene (1991), Thorpe (1997) and Goldberg (1998), who analyze the impact of 
the US CAFE standard on market outcomes in the short run.  In the long run, however, 
the firms can respond to the policy by changing the product technology (see Kleit, 2004).  
The impact of the regulation on the market outcome would be different in each scenario.  
In this paper we only focus on the short run policy impact.3 
We analyze the impact of each regulation on firm profit in a duopoly market.  
Most of the literature on CAFE assumes a monopoly or a perfectly competitive market 
and thus the impact of the regulation on firm profit is not an interesting one.  It is clear a 
priori that the monopolist is always worse off under the regulation and that in a perfectly 
competitive market the regulation would leave firm profit unaffected after entry/ exit 
occurs.  The question of the impact of regulation on firm profit becomes more interesting 
in an oligopoly setting where the strategic behavior of firms may render the regulation 
profitable.  It is also more consistent with the empirical evidence where, for example, the 
appliances market and the automobile market are supplied by few sellers.  In fact, studies 
by Bresnahan (1987), Alley (1997), Ramrattan (2001) and Yamawaki (2002) present 
evidence supporting the existence of imperfect competition in the US automobile 
industry. 
We show that, although the two policies result in substitution of the polluting 
product with the clean one, their impact on competition and thus firm profit is quite 
different.  In particular the quota can be profitable over some range, while the AES is 
always profit reducing.  Even over the range where the quota results in a lower profit 
equilibrium, the profit level is still higher than under a comparable AES.  This is 
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consistent with the empirical evidence that CAFE regulation has negatively affected 
producers’ profit and that the automobiles industry continues to resist all attempts to 
tighten CAFE (Kleit, 1990, Leone and Parkinson, 1990, Goldberg 1998 and Kleit, 2002). 
Automakers claim that the new regulation that requires raising CAFE to 35mpg by 2020, 
will cost them $83 billion (Taylor III, 2007).  We also find that a given level of 
environmental quality can be achieved with less cost to firms under the quota.  Thus, the 
quota policy may be politically more feasible to implement than CAFE since the 
automobiles industry would perceive it as a less costly regulation or even as a profitable 
opportunity.  This is specifically important given the current policy deadlock under 
CAFE, which signals the need for a different policy that does not unite the automobiles 
industry in opposition to it (Dunn, 2007).4 
Besides the impact on firm profit, we also show that the impact of each policy on 
consumers, environmental quality and social welfare is quite different. The quota always 
reduces consumer surplus while the AES raises consumer surplus over a certain range.  
On the other hand, the quota always guarantees a reduction in total energy consumption, 
which is not necessarily true under the AES.  Thus, regulations like CAFE can be 
detrimental to environmental quality in addition to having a negative impact on firm 
profit.  The optimal policy that addresses both the externality problem as well as the 
imperfect competition problem will ultimately depend on the magnitude of damages per 
unit of energy consumption.  When unit damages are high enough, a quota is superior in 
terms of welfare to the AES as it reduces output of both models.  Thus, the quota is a 
superior alternative to tightening the current CAFE standard if damages from energy 
consumption, in terms of emissions or dependence on foreign sources of oil, are high. 
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The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section II outlines the basic model 
structure.  Section III and section IV present the market equilibrium under each 
regulation.  Section V compares the different policies.  The welfare implications are 
discussed in section VI.  Section VII concludes. 
  
II. The Model 
We use the basic structure of the product line model where there are two possible 
versions of a product: a low efficiency and a high efficiency model.  To illustrate the 
tradeoff between energy efficiency and overall product quality, we assume that the low 
efficiency model (denoted by L) is of a higher overall quality than the high efficiency 
model (denoted by E).  In the automobiles context, for example, the low efficiency model 
represents the luxury automobile and the high efficiency model represents the economy 
or the compact automobile, where the compact automobile consumes less energy per mile 
than the luxury automobile but the luxury automobile provides greater power, comfort 
and safety. 
We assume there are N consumers of the product who vary in their intensity of 
use, denoted θ, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].   We can think of θ as, for 
example, the number of miles driven, which we assume is determined by exogenous 
factors.5  Each consumer has the option to buy a single unit of the product, i.e., either the 
luxury model or the economy model, or not to buy.  The utility of a consumer of type θ 
who purchases a unit of model s (s=L or E) is given by: 
(1)  ,s s e s sV p x P
θ ω θ θ= − −  
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where sω  is the quality of model s, with L Eω ω> , ep  is the unit price of energy, sx  is the 
energy consumption  per unit of use by the type-s model where E Lx x< , and sP is the 
price of the type-s model.  All consumers derive higher utility from quality and energy 
efficiency.  The utility function can be simplified as follows: 
(2)     ,s s sV P
θ α θ= −  
where s s e sp xα ω= −  represents the net benefit per use.6  By assumption E Lα α< ,7 which 
indicates that, although it consumes more energy per use, the net benefit per use, and 
therefore overall quality, is higher for the luxury model as its quality is much better than 
the economy model.8  If the two models were offered for sale for the same price, all 
consumers would buy the luxury model.  The marginal rate of substitution between 
overall quality and price is constant for each consumer as shown in (2).  As in Bresnahan 
(1987), this yields demand equations that are linear in price as shown below. 
Each consumer chooses to buy the model that yields the highest utility.  The 
heterogeneity in use implies that consumers buy different models.  A consumer of type θ 
will buy the luxury model if and only if  
(3) .L EL
L E
P Pθ θ α α
−≥ ≡ −  
Likewise, he will buy the economy model if and only if 
(4)     .EL E
E
Pθ θ θ α> ≥ ≡  
Finally, consumers for whom Eθ θ<  choose not to buy the product at all.9  In this case 
utility is )(θU , which is normalized to zero.  Since E Lα α<  and given equation (3), in 
equilibrium E LP P< .10  Otherwise, only the luxury model would be traded in equilibrium. 
This is consistent with the empirical observation that luxury automobiles are more 
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expensive than economy automobiles.  Thus, the prices of the two models (along with the 
other parameters) induce a partitioning of consumers.  The associated inverse demand 
equations are as follows: 
(5)    ( ) ( )L EL L EP N Q QN N
α α= − −  
and 
(6)    ( )EE L EP N Q QN
α= − − . 
We normalize and assume N=1.  Finally, we assume that production costs are quadratic.  
This implies 
(7) 2( ) ( ) ,s s s sC q c q=  
where sq  is the quantity of model s produced by an individual firm.  
We will compare the equilibrium in the pre-regulation scenario to that under the 
regulation.  Specifically, we will consider the equilibrium under two types of regulations: 
a quota that imposes an upper limit on the output of the polluting model, and an AES that 
imposes an upper limit on the average energy consumption across the models produced.11  
The quota is given by  
(8)     iLq K≤ , 
where iLq is firm i’s output of the luxury model.  This is the constraint used in Ahmed and 
Segerson (2007a).  Note that a sufficiently high value of K, set above the unconstrained 
output level, is a non-binding regulation corresponding to the free market scenario, while 
a value of K equal to zero represents a regulation that completely eliminates the luxury 
model from the market.  On the other hand, the AES is given by 
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(9)     ,
i i
E E L L
i i
E L
x q x q
q q
η+ ≤+  
where η  is below the free market level of weighted average energy consumption across 
models.12  The constraint can be simplified to 
i
L
i
E
q Z
q
≤  where E
L
xZ
x
η
η
−= − .
13  It does not 
directly restrict production of any model.  Firms can freely set the amounts of each as 
long as this ratio is below Z.  The CAFE standard is also an AES that mandates an upper 
limit on the harmonic average of miles per gallon across the different models.  The CAFE 
standard can be written in terms of energy consumption as follows 
(10)     ,
i i
E L
i i
E L
E L
q q
q q
x x
η+ ≤
+
 
which simplifies to 
i
L
i
E
q H
q
≤  where ( )
( )
L E
E L
x xH
x x
η
η
−= − .
14  For simplicity, we will represent 
the average efficiency regulation by an upper limit on the ratio of the luxury to the 
economy models that a firm produces.   
The market is supplied by two firms that have identical costs and are Cournot 
competitors.15  Thus, given the inverse market demands in (5) and (6), firm i chooses iEq
1
jq
 
and iLq  
j
Mq
so as to maximize    
 (11)            2 2( ) ( )i i i i iE E L L E E L LP q P q c q c qΠ = + − − . 
We will use superscript 0i  to denote the equilibrium quantities and profit of firm i 
under the pre-regulation scenario.  The following proposition describes the pre-regulation 
market equilibrium.16  
Proposition 1: (i) 0 0L EP P> , (ii) 10 20 0s s sq q q= =  for s=E or L. 
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In equilibrium each firm produces both models, i.e., there is no quality 
specialization.17    As expected, it can be shown that in equilibrium the price of the luxury 
model is higher than that of the economy model.  Because the economy model provides 
lower net benefit per use, in equilibrium it must have a lower purchase price in order to 
induce any consumers to buy it.  The price differential creates a partitioning of the market 
such that the high use consumers end up buying the higher energy consuming model as 
shown in Figure 1, which intensifies the emissions problem.  For the rest of the paper the 
superscript i for the firm will be dropped since all the equilibria are symmetric.  
 
III. Market Equilibrium under Quota 
Under the quota, each firm maximizes profit in (11) subject to the constraint 
that Lq K≤ , where K is below 0Lq .  The effect of this reduction is summarized in 
Proposition 2, where the superscript K denotes equilibrium values under the quota. 
 
Proposition 2: The quota results in: 
(i) an increase in production of the economy model by each firm and hence in 
total ( i.e., 0
K
Eq
K
∂ <∂  and hence 0
K
EQ
K
∂ <∂ ), and  
(ii) an increases in  the prices of both models ( i.e., 0
K
LP
K
∂ <∂  and 0
K
EP
K
∂ <∂ ). 
 
The quota results in a substitution towards the economy model.18  Limiting the 
output of the luxury model below the market equilibrium reduces competition between 
firms in that market and raises the price of the luxury model.  This causes some 
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consumers of the luxury model to switch to the economy version, which in turn raises its 
price.  Due to the increased demand output of the economy model increases. 
We consider the impact of the quota on profits by examining ( )K Kπ , the 
individual firm’s maximum profit as a function of K.  In particular, we ask how profit 
varies with reductions in K.  The relationship between ( )K Kπ and K is summarized in 
Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3: ( )K Kπ  is single peaked and reaches a maximum at a value of K given by 
*K , where * 0LK q< .    
Proposition 3 implies that a quota on the production of the luxury cars can 
actually be profitable.  To provide some intuition, we first show that, at the pre-regulation 
equilibrium, a marginal decline in K allows firms to reach a higher profit equilibrium 
point.  The equilibrium quantity of the economy model under the quota is given by  
 (12)      (1 3 )
3 2
K E
E
E E
Kq
c
α
α
−= + . 
Substituting KLK q= ,  (12)  gives the equation of the equilibrium locus ( , )K KL Eq q for 
varying values of K, depicted in Figure 2.  Note that the equilibrium locus is linear.  
Figure 2 also depicts an iso-profit line through the pre-regulation equilibrium point O.  
This iso-profit line provides a profit ranking of all the quantity choices assuming 
symmetry, i.e., both firms produce the same quantities of each model, which is always 
true in equilibrium.  The equation of the iso-profit line is derived by setting 
 i iΠ = Π , i jE Eq q=  and i jL Lq q=  in (11).  The slope of the iso-profit line is given by 
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(13)      E L
L
E
dq q
dq
q
∂Π
∂= − ∂Π
∂
. 
To show that a marginal decline in K will always increase firm profit, we show that the 
equilibrium locus is flatter than the iso-profit line at point O.  Using the inverse demand 
equations in (5) and (6) and evaluating (13) at 0 0( , )E Lq q  shows (after simplification) that 
the slope of the iso-profit line at the pre-regulation equilibrium is E L
L E
dq
dq
α
α= − , which is 
less than 3
3 2
E
E Ec
α
α− + , the slope of the equilibrium locus.  Thus the iso-profit line is 
steeper than the equilibrium locus at point O (as depicted in Figure 2), implying that a 
marginal decline in K will put the firm on an iso-profit line corresponding to a higher 
profit level.  
More formally, we can decompose the effect of changing K on firm profit as 
follows.  Firm i’s maximum profit is given by the Lagrangian function 
(14)     2 2( ) ( ) ( )iK i i i i iL L E E L L E E LP q P q c q c q K qεΦ = + − − + − , 
where ε  is the Lagrangian multiplier.  The impact of a reduction in K on firm profit is 
given by 
(15)    {
, ,i i i iL E L E
iK iK
i iL E
L E
restriction q q q q
effect
strategic effect
d dP dPq q
K dK dK dK
π ε∂ Φ= = + +∂ 14444244443
 
where 
,j jL E
j j
s s sL E
q q L E
dP P Pdq dq
dK Q dK Q dK
∂ ∂= +∂ ∂   for s=L,E and ij ≠ .  
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This decomposition shows that the regulation has two effects on firm profit: a restriction 
effect and a strategic effect.19  The restriction effect represents the effect on firm i’s profit 
as a result of restricting its own quantity choices.  The restriction effects is always 
positive for values of K below 0Lq , indicating that limiting firm i’s choices, all else equal, 
is always detrimental to its profit.  Thus, in the absence of competition, i.e., in a 
monopoly market, the quota would always reduce profits.  However the existence of 
competition generates a second effect, the strategic effect, which represents the gain in 
profit to firm i as a result of limiting the quantity choices of its competitor, firm j.   The 
strategic effect captures the change in firm i’s profit as market prices change in response 
to firm j’s quantity choices.  Thus, the strategic effect captures the impact of the 
constraint on competition between firms.   
While the restriction effect is always positive for 0LK q< , the sign of the strategic 
effect is generally ambiguous.20  The constraint can increase or decrease competition 
depending on the specific demand functions as well as the type of restriction imposed on 
firms.21  With the linear demand and quadratic cost assumed here, the restriction effect is 
given by  
(16)    
2 23 9(2 3 )
3 2 3 2
E E
L L L
E E E E
K c
c c
α αε α αα α= − − + −+ + , 
while the strategic effect, denoted by τ , is given by  
(17)    2 2 22
1 [ 2 ((9 12 )( ) 4 )]
(3 2 ) E E E E E L E L EE E
c K c c
c
τ α α α α α αα= − − + − ++ . 
The strategic effect in  (17)  is always negative over the range 0LK q< , suggesting 
that limiting the quantity of the luxury model produced by firm j has a positive impact on 
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firm i’s profit as it reduces competition between firms. The net effect on firm i’s profit 
will thus depend on the value of K. 
The relationship between profits and K implied by Proposition 3 is depicted in 
Figure 3.  It shows that up to a given level, the quota will actually increase firm profit 
relative to the pre-regulation equilibrium, although beyond a certain point further 
restriction of the quota will decrease profit.  In fact firm profit when the luxury model is 
completely eliminated is lower than at the pre-regulation level. 
 
IV. Market Equilibrium under the Average Efficiency Standard (AES) 
Under this policy, we assume that each firm faces an upper limit on the weighted 
average of energy consumption across the models it produces.  Each firm maximizes 
profit in (11) subject to the constraint in (9).  The impact on the market equilibrium is 
summarized in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: A tightening of the AES results in: 
(i) an increase in production of the economy model by each firm and hence in 
total ( i.e., 0
Z
Eq
Z
∂ <∂  and hence 0
Z
EQ
Z
∂ <∂ ),  
(ii)  a decrease in production of the luxury model by each firm and hence in total 
(i.e., 0
Z
Lq
Z
∂ >∂  and hence 0
Z
LQ
Z
∂ >∂ ), 
(iii) an increase in the price of the luxury model( i.e., 0
Z
LP
Z
∂ <∂ ), and 
(iv) a decline in the price of the economy model (i.e., 0
Z
EP
Z
∂ >∂ ) up to a certain 
level of Z and then an increase in its price. 
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The average efficiency constraint allows firms more flexibility in the output 
choice.  While it would be possible for firms to meet the standard by expanding 
production of both models such that the ratio of the luxury to the economy model is Z, in 
equilibrium firms choose to comply by limiting the output of the luxury model and 
substituting towards the economy model as under the quota.22   
Initially tightening the AES will always reduce the price of the economy model, 
in comparison to its pre-regulation level as shown in Figure 4.23  The reduction in price 
allows the firm to sell the necessary amount of the economy model required to offset 
sales of the luxury model.  This causes some consumers who were either buying the 
luxury model or not buying at all to start buying the economy model.  The impact of the 
standard on the partitioning of consumers by purchase decisions is shown in Figure 1.  
However, with a further tightening of the standard the reduction in the price of the 
economy model ceases.  As the market of the economy model reaches a given size, 
tightening the standard further requires a smaller increase in output of the economy 
model for a given reduction in output of the luxury model. 24  This results in a rise in the 
price of the economy model as depicted in Figure 4 and a reduction in market coverage.  
As Z is reduced to zero, the price of the economy model reaches a higher level than the 
pre-regulation level.  Several empirical studies that estimate the impact of CAFE on 
automobile prices find that it led to an increase in large automobile prices and a decline in 
small automobile prices (see, for example, Agras (1999)).  This is consistent with our 
prediction for standards that are not too stringent.   
The impact of the AES on firm profit, given by ( )Z Zπ , is stated in Proposition 5. 
Proposition 5: ( )Z Zπ  is monotonic and increasing in Z.   
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Proposition 5 implies that, regardless of its stringency, the AES always reduces 
firm profit, i.e., 0Zπ π< for all values of Z.  The equilibrium locus under the AES in 
( , )E Lq q space is shown in Figure 2 and is implicitly defined by the following equation:  
(18)    2 2(3 2 ) (3 2 ) 6E E L L E E E L L L E E Lq q q c q c q qα α α α α+ = + + + + . 
The slope of the equilibrium locus is given by 
(19)    2 (3 2 ) 6
2 (3 2 ) 6
E L L L L E E
L E E E E E L
dq q c q
dq q c q
α α α
α α α
− + −= − − + − . 
At the pre-regulation equilibrium, the slope of the iso-profit line is flatter than the slope 
of the equilibrium locus, as shown in Figure 2, indicating that a marginal tightening of 
the AES results in equilibrium points with lower profit.   
As with the quota, we can decompose the effect of the AES on firm profit.  Firm 
i’s profit under the AES is given by the Lagrangian function 
(20)     2 2( ) ( ) ( )
i
iZ i i i i L
L L E E L L E E i
E
qP q P q c q c q Z
q
ρΦ = + − − + −  
where ρ  is the Lagrangian multiplier.  The impact of a reduction in Z on firm profit is 
given by 
(21)    {
, ,i i i iL E L E
iZ iZ
i iL E
L E
q q q qrestriction
effect
strategic effect
d dP dPq q
Z dZ dZ dZ
π ρ∂ Φ= = + +∂ 14444244443
 
where 
dZ
dq
Q
P
dZ
dq
Q
P
dZ
dP jE
E
s
j
L
L
s
qq
s
i
E
i
L
∂
∂+∂
∂=
,
  for s=L, E and ij ≠ .  
The restriction effect is given by 
(22)     2 2 2
( )(2 3 ( ) 2 )
(2 2 3 (1 2 ) 3 )
E L L E E L E E L
E L E L
Z c Z c
c c Z Z Z
α α α α α α αρ α α
+ − − −= + + + + , 
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which is always positive for values of 0Z Z< .  The strategic effect, denoted byδ , is 
given by 
(23)    2 2 22 2 3
( ) {2 ( 2 (1 4 ))
(2 2 3( 2 ))
E L
E E L E L
E L E E L
Z c Z Z
c c Z Z Z
α αδ α α α αα α α
+= − + + ++ + + +  
2( )[ (3( )( 2 ) 2 ( (2 3 ) (1 2 )))]}E L E L E E E L L E LZ Z Z c Z Z Z Zα α α α α α α α α α+ + − + + − + + +  
Initially tightening the standard gives rise to a positive strategic effect, suggesting that 
tightening the standard reduces firm profit, all else equal.  This is the range where 
tightening the standard increases competition between firms, which results in a decline in 
the price of the economy model.  Further tightening of the standard gives rise to a 
negative strategic effect. 25  At that point tightening the standard reduces competition 
between firms.  While this is beneficial to firms, the gain in profit from reduced 
competition is outweighed by the loss in profit due to the regulation becoming too 
restricting.  According to this specification, the net effect of tightening the AES is always 
a reduction in firm profit since the restriction effect always outweighs the strategic effect. 
Proposition 5 suggests that regulations like CAFE are always profit reducing.   
Kleit (1990) shows that initially tightening CAFE may increase firm profit depending on 
the parameter values.  Absent any substitution between models, Kliet shows that CAFE 
can enforce a cartel like outcome by limiting the output of the luxury model.  In this 
paper, such an outcome is not possible due to substitution between models, which 
adversely affects the profit gain from limiting the supply of luxury automobiles.  This is 
especially true as CAFE initially reduces the price of the economy model. 
 
V. Comparison of Market Equilibria 
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 The previous sections compare equilibrium under each policy to the pre-
regulation equilibrium. This section compares the equilibrium under the quota to that 
under the AES in terms of how they affect prices, quantities and, in turn, firm profit.  We 
will first compare the two policies holding the average energy consumption constant.  
This will help us better understand the role of competition between firms.  We then 
compare the two policies holding total energy consumption constant to determine which 
policy achieves a target level of environmental quality with lower cost to firms.   
To fix a given level of average energy consumption across the two models, we 
will assume that Z is equal to L
E
K
K
q
q
.  Proposition 6 compares the equilibrium quantities and 
prices under both policies. 
 
Proposition 6: (i) K ZE Eq q< , (ii) K ZL Lq q< , (iii) K ZE EP P> , (iv) K ZL LP P>  and (v) K Zπ π>  for 
a given level of average efficiency. 
While both policies cause a substitution towards the economy model, the impact 
on prices and quantities is different. The quota fixes the quantity that each firm can 
produce of the luxury model at K, and thus limits competition between firms in that 
market.  Figure 2 shows the equilibrium locus under the quota and the AES.  Point A is 
the equilibrium under the quota, K, and point B is the equilibrium under a comparable 
AES, Z, i.e., both points A and B achieve the same level of average energy consumption.  
Thus, under a comparable AES output of each model is higher and price is lower than 
under a quota.  While A and B achieve an identical level of average efficiency, point A is 
more profitable (i.e., lies on a higher iso-profit line) than B.  However, although it is 
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feasible, point A is not the equilibrium point under the AES, Z.  Firms are in a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma situation where competition drives firms to the lower profit equilibrium point 
B.26   
 A given level of average energy consumption can be achieved with less reduction 
in firm profit by a quota than an AES.  However, total energy consumption is higher 
under B since output of each model is higher.  To achieve the same level of total energy 
consumption as under A, further tightening of the AES is needed, which reduces profit 
even more.  Proposition 7 follows. 
Proposition 7: K Zπ π>  for a given level of total emissions. 
 Thus, a given level of total energy consumption can be achieved at lower cost to 
firms under the quota than the AES.  This suggests that a quota may be politically more 
feasible than an AES, if policy makers are concerned about the impact of regulation on 
firms.27 
 
VI. The impact on social welfare 
There are two sources of market imperfections in this model: the Cournot 
competition and the externality.  The former imperfection implies that there is 
underproduction of automobiles while the latter suggests that the market output is higher 
than the socially optimum level.  Since the policies we consider have a different impact 
on total output, the policy choice will depend on which market imperfection dominates, 
which in turn depends on the magnitude of the parameters and on the damages resulting 
from a unit of energy consumption, d.   
For a given partitioning of consumers, social welfare is defined as follows 
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(24)    
1
2 2(1 ) ( )
L
L E
S S
L E L L E L ESW d d c c
θ
θ θ
θα θ θα θ θ θ θ= + − − − −∫ ∫ , 
where SLα and SEα are the net benefit per use to society defined by ( )SL L e Lp d xα ω= − + and 
( )SE E e Ep d xα ω= − + .  Given the uniform distribution ofθ , this simplifies to 
 (25)    ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
2 2
S SL E
L E L L E E L
Q QSW Q Q Q Q Qα α= − + − − . 
The social welfare under the quota, ( , )K KSW SW K d≡ , is obtained by substituting the 
equilibrium quantities, KLQ  and
K
EQ , into  (25).  This depends on both the stringency of the 
quota and the magnitude of unit damages.  Similarly, we derive the social welfare under 
the AES, ( , )Z ZSW SW Z d≡ .  We will analyze how changing K or Z affects welfare for a 
given level of d, and compare that to the pre-regulation level of social welfare, 
0 0 ( )SW SW d≡ , which is obtained by substituting the pre-regulation equilibrium values 
0
LQ  and
0
EQ into  (25). 
First, we consider the impact of each policy on social welfare when d=0.  This 
will show how each policy can address the imperfect competition problem.  We will then 
analyze the welfare impact of each policy for positive values of d. 
Proposition 8: When d=0, the AES can increase social welfare while the quota is always 
welfare reducing. 
Because of imperfect competition, the market will always supply an output level of each 
model below the socially optimal level denoted by point So in Figure 5.  The quota results 
in further reduction in total output.  Although this raises industry profit over a certain 
range, it will always decrease consumer surplus since prices of both models are higher, 
and result in a reduction in social welfare.  This is clear in Figure 5 where tightening the 
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quota always results in a lower welfare point when d=0.  Tightening the AES, on the 
other hand, initially increases total output and raises social welfare.28  In Figure 5 the iso-
social welfare line corresponding to d=0 that passes through point O intersects the 
equilibrium locus under the AES, suggesting that higher welfare equilibrium points can 
be achieved.  This shows that AES, which is usually adopted in contexts of 
environmental regulation and quality controls, is actually capable of addressing problems 
of imperfect competition. 
We turn next to the impact of each policy when d>0.  We first consider the effect 
of the quota on social welfare. 
Proposition 9: For a high enough value of d, the quota is welfare improving.   
Whether the quota improves social welfare will depend on whether the gains to 
society from reduced environmental damages offsets the resulting loss in market surplus.  
The magnitude of the gain will depend on the value of d.  When d is high enough, there is 
over production of both models relative to the socially optimal levels of output, point SH.  
This is shown in Figure 5 where there is more production of both models at point O than 
point SH.  Thus, the quota, by reducing total output, can raise social welfare.  This is 
depicted in Figure 5 where the iso-social welfare line corresponding to high levels of d 
that passes through point O intersects the equilibrium locus under the quota, indicating 
that higher welfare equilibrium points can be achieved.   
Next, we turn to the impact of the AES on social welfare.  Whether the standard 
raises welfare will depend on its impact on total emissions as well as the magnitude of d.   
Proposition 10:  If 0E
Z
∂ >∂  for all values of Z, then the AES is always welfare improving. 
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If tightening the standard results in a reduction in total emissions, then the AES is 
welfare enhancing.  While tightening the quota reduces market surplus, a marginal 
reduction in Z at the pre-regulation equilibrium always improves market surplus.  This is 
because the gain in consumer surplus outweighs the associated losses in firm profit.  If 
total emissions decline with a reduction in Z, then the AES always improves social 
welfare. 29  This is true regardless of the value of d (although d determines the optimal 
value of Z). 
Proposition 11: If 0E
Z
∂ <∂ at
0Z , then the AES raises SW only for low enough values of d. 
When total emissions increase initially under the standard, then whether the 
standard raises social welfare will depend on the value of d.  The standard raises social 
welfare if the gains in market surplus outweigh the damages associated with the increased 
emissions level that accrue from a marginal reduction in Z.  When d is low, the damages 
to society from emissions are relatively low and the gains from a marginal decline in Z 
outweigh the cost to society.  However, for high enough values of d, as shown in Figure 
5, the environmental damages exceed any possible gains in market surplus, and thus 
tightening the standard is welfare reducing.   
The above analysis was based on exogenous values of K and Z.  To determine the 
optimal policy, we compare social welfare when K and Z are endogenously chosen.30  We 
use * *( ( ), )ZSW SW Z d d≡  and * *( ( ), )KSW SW K d d≡ to denote social welfare under each 
policy given that the policy is optimally adjusted to the value of d.  Based on the above 
analysis whether the quota or the AES is more efficient will depend on the value of d.  
Thus, for a given d the quota is superior to the AES if * * 0K ZSW SW SW> ≥  and vice 
versa. 
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Proposition 12: When d is high enough, the quota policy is more efficient than the AES, 
i.e., * * 0K ZSW SW SW> ≥ .  
If the stringency of the policy is chosen optimally, then even when the AES is 
always welfare improving, the quota can still be a superior policy.  Figure 6 illustrates 
Proposition 12 for the case where the AES is welfare improving for all values of d (see 
proposition 10), and thus *ZSW will always be higher than 0SW .  As illustrated, when d is 
low enough, the optimal quota is non binding, and hence * 0KSW SW= .  However, 
*KSW is higher than 0SW when d is high enough, i.e., higher than some cutoff value Kd .  
When d is high enough, i.e., d exceeds *d in Figure 6, then the quota is superior to the 
AES.31 
 
VII. Conclusion 
When environmental damages result from the use of the final product, the policy 
objective is to substitute cleaner products for the polluting ones.  While the quota and the 
AES can achieve that end, they vary in their impact on firms, consumers, environmental 
quality and social welfare.  In this paper we show that, while it is generally believed that 
the increased flexibility that an AES provides is beneficial to firms, this flexibility in an 
oligopoly model is, in fact, detrimental to firm profit.  A quota that defines the maximum 
amount that can be produced of the polluting model reduces competition between firms 
and thus can, over a certain range, raise firm profit in comparison to the pre-regulation 
level.  This is in contrast to the AES which initially increases competition between firms 
and always reduces firm profit.  In addition, we show that a quota achieves a given level 
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of environmental quality at a lower cost to firms than an AES.  Thus, a quota policy 
should be preferred by firms.  
The AES does not guarantee an improvement in environmental quality, which is 
the objective of the regulation in the first place.  If the economy model is not sufficiently 
fuel efficient, total emissions can actually increase under the AES, as the standard 
increases total market sales, and therefore, all else equal, overall energy consumption.  In 
contrast the quota always reduces emissions.  This suggests that policies like CAFE can 
actually result in a deterioration in environmental quality, if the alternative fuel economy 
automobiles available in the market are not significantly fuel efficient. 
Taken together, both findings suggest that the quota can outperform the AES in 
terms of environmental quality and profit.  However, it does not necessarily imply that 
the quota should be the policy choice. The policy choice should consider the impact of 
each on consumer surplus and ultimately social welfare.  Relative to the pre-regulation 
equilibrium consumers are better off under the AES over a certain range, while consumer 
surplus always declines under a quota.  Since there are two sources of market 
imperfection, the imperfect competition and the externality, the socially optimal policy 
will be determined by the magnitude of unit damages.  At low levels of damages an AES 
achieves higher values of social welfare than a quota.  When damages are high enough, 
the quota is a superior policy since the gains from improved environmental quality 
outweigh any reduction in market surplus.   
The results have important implications for policy making.  It is important to 
understand the different choices available.  For example, advocates of tightening the 
CAFE standards believe that this is necessary if further improvements in environmental 
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quality are to be achieved.  However, when damages are high enough tightening CAFE is 
not the only option available, and in fact it may be welfare reducing.  Switching to a 
quota-based regulation guarantees an improvement in environmental quality and delivers 
the maximum improvement in social welfare.     
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X. Appendix : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1  
The market segmentation under the quota and the AES in comparison to the pre-
regulation equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
The equilibrium locus and the iso-profit lines under each policy. 
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Figure 3 
The impact of the quota on the firm profit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
The impact of the AES on the price of the economy model. 
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Figure 5 
Iso-social welfare lines for different values of d.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Social welfare under the average efficiency regulation and the quota when the AES is 
always welfare improving. 
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1 Examples of models with product lines include Gal-Or (1983), Brander and Eaton (1984), Bresnahan 
(1987), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), De Fraja (1996) and Johnson and Myatt (2003). 
 
2 In a related paper, Ahmed and Segerson (2007a) consider the effect of a voluntary industry agreement for 
products where there is no tradeoff between energy efficiency and product quality, such as some 
appliances. 
 
3 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the standard and the quota on firm profit when firms change the 
energy efficiency of the products, see Ahmed and Segerson (2007b). 
 
4 The fact that a quota policy can increase firm profit in markets where competition is not perfect may 
represent a significant drawback especially in contexts where policy makers are mainly concerned about 
consumers’ welfare.  It can be shown that a system of auctioned permits gives rise to the same equilibrium 
outcome as under the quota without raising firm profit.  The gains in profit accrue to the government 
through the sale of the permits, which can then be redistributed to consumers.  In addition to its role as a 
means of distributing surplus, the permit system can potentially enhance efficiency if trade in permits is 
allowed.  However, since firms are identical in this model, the well-known efficiency gains from allowing 
trade do not arise here. 
 
5 Empirical analysis suggests that the elasticity of use with respect to price per mile is small, if not 
insignificant.  See Goldberg (1998). 
 
6 We restrict analysis to positive values of α to ensure that the products are traded in the market.  Otherwise 
when 0sα ≤  there will be no demand for the products. 
7 We assume that L E
L Ex x
ω ω> .  Thus, over the range of ep where both models are traded, the net benefit per 
use is always higher for the luxury model, i.e., L Eα α> . 
8 It is possible to have a tradeoff between energy efficiency and quality and still have E Lα α> .  In this 
case, consumer preferences over the two models would be identical to that of Ahmed and Segerson (2007a) 
where there was no tradeoff and the analysis would be the same. 
 
9 It is possible that consumers who do not buy either a luxury or an economy automobile will end up 
driving a used automobile where the utility of driving a used automobile is normalized to zero.  This 
assumes that the price of a used automobile is unaffected by changes in prices of other models, which is 
consistent with Bresnahan (1987).   
 
10 See Proposition 2.  
 
11 This is equivalent to mandating that weighted average energy consumption across the fleet not exceed a 
given value. 
12 The binding range of η is 0[0, )η where 0 2( ) 3 ( )
2( ) 3 ( )
L E L E L E E L L E
L E E L E L E
c x c x x
c c
α α α α αη α α α α α
+ + −= + + − . 
13 The binding range of Z is 0[0, )Z where 
0
0
0
3 ( ) 2
2
L E L E L E
E E L
q cZ
q c
α α α α
α
− += = . 
14 The CAFE regulation imposes a fine on non-complying firms.  We assume that firms comply with the 
regulation and are not subjected to the fine. 
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15 Although the US automobiles market is supplied by both domestic and foreign firms, we assume that 
firms are identical since they are all subject to the same standard.  Although domestic and foreign firms 
may have different cost advantage, the simplifying assumption here helps to better emphasize how each 
policy affects the market outcome differently.  
 
16  Proofs of all propositions will be provided upon request. 
 
17 Most of the literature on quality competition show a quality specialization equilibrium where each firm 
tends to differentiate its products from competitors, which is not the case here since this is a product line 
model where each firm produces all models.  See, for example, Shaked and Sutton (1982), Besanko, 
Donnenfeld and White (1987), Motta (1993), DeFraja (1996), Wauthy (1996), Lehman-Grube (1997), 
Valetti (2000) and Wang and Yang (2001). 
 
18 The quota policy is equivalent to a tax on the luxury model where firms keep the tax revenue.  The 
Lagrange multiplier can be interpreted as the tax rate. 
 
19 This is an application of the general principle that, in the presence of strategic behavior, the shadow price 
of a constraint is not simply the Lagrange multiplier (see Caputo 2006).     
20 Without specific functional forms, the sign of 
,iH iL
s
q q
dP
dK
will be ambiguous since s
H
P
Q
∂
∂ >0 , 
s
L
P
Q
∂
∂ >0, 
jK
Hdq
dK
 <0 and 0
jK
Ldq
dK
> . 
 
21 For an illustration of a constraint that can increase competition between firms and gives rise to a positive 
strategic effect, i.e., changes production decisions of firm j such that firm i’s profit decreases, see Ahmed 
and Segerson (2007b). 
 
22 The AES is equivalent to a tax on the luxury model where its revenue is used to subsidize production of 
the economy model.  This explains why total market output can increase under the AES but not under the 
quota. 
 
23 In a model with no substitution between product models Kleit (1990) finds that the price of the economy 
automobiles may decline initially depending on the value of certain parameters of the model.  We show 
here that this always holds regardless of any parameter values. 
24 Totally differentiating the constraint 
i
L
i
E
q Z
q
= , we get that the extra production of the economy model 
for a marginal decline in the luxury model to meet the reduction in Z is 
1 (1 )E E
L L
dq dZq
dq Z dq
= − .  The 
expansion in the economy model, E
L
dq
dq
, is inversely related to Eq .  This implies that, for a large enough 
Eq , the demand effect outweighs the increased production effect and the price of the economy model rises. 
 
25 The strategic effect, according to this model’s specification, is  
3 4
2 2 2
8 ( ) 0
(4 6( ) 9 ( )) (2( ) 3 ( ))
L E L E
L E E L L E E L E L E E L E L L E
c
c c c c c c
α α α
α α α α α α α α α α α
− >+ + + − + + −  at 
0Z Z= and is 
3 2
3
3 ( ) 2 ( ) 0
(2 3 ) 3 ( ))
E L E E E L E
E E E L L E
c
c
α α α α α α
α α α α α
− − − + <+ + −  at 0Z = . 
 37
                                                                                                                                                 
 
26 In the monopoly case, we can show that a given level of average efficiency can be achieved with less 
cost to firms under an AES than under a quota.  In contrast to the duopoly market, a point like B would be 
more profitable than a point like A under a monopoly market indicating that the flexibility of the AES is 
beneficial to firms in the absence of competition.   
 
27 Tightening the quota always results in a reduction in total emissions since the elimination of a unit of the 
luxury model under the quota increases production of the economy model by less than one unit.  This is not 
always possible under the AES where total emissions can initially increase.  Whether this is possible or not 
will depend on, all else equal, the magnitude of Ex  relative to Lx .  For a one unit reduction of the luxury 
model, initially tightening the AES increases production of the economy model by more than one unit.   If 
the economy model is not significantly more fuel efficient, then the savings in energy per use will be 
outweighed by the increased total use from increased sales, resulting in increased energy consumption.  
This is consistent with Kwoka (1987), who shows that CAFE regulation can potentially increase energy 
consumption depending on miles per gallon of both models.  Kliet (1990) shows through simulations that a 
similar result is possible. 
 
28 While the quota always decreases consumer surplus, tightening the AES increases consumer surplus 
initially.  This is because the loss in consumer surplus from the higher price of the luxury model is more 
than offset by the lower price of the economy model.  With further tightening of the standard, consumer 
surplus reaches a maximum and starts to decline. The fact that CAFE can increase or decrease consumer 
surplus provides an explanation for the conflicting evidence in the CAFE literature on its impact on 
consumer surplus.  Agras and Chapman (1999) estimate a negative impact on consumer surplus while Kleit 
(1990) showed that CAFE may initially increase consumer surplus depending on the parameter values. 
 
29 Parry et al. (2004) show that in the absence of market failures on the consumption side, i.e., when people 
value improvements in fuel economy, a binding CAFE will always reduce social welfare assuming a 
perfectly competitive market.  The results here are different because we model a duopoly market with 
Cournot competition.  The results we derive here suggest that in the absence of a consumption externality, 
i.e., when d=0, the AES can still increase social welfare because it corrects the market failure associated 
with the Cournot competition. 
  
30 Alternatively, we could fix the emissions level and compare social welfare under each policy.  The 
results are consistent with the above analysis. 
 
31 It is possible that there is a range of d over which neither policy improves welfare.  This will be true 
when the AES initially increases emissions and when K Zd d> .  Thus for K Zd d d< < , neither policy 
is welfare improving.  An AES would reduce welfare since the total damages from increased energy 
consumption outweigh any gains in market surplus.  Also, a quota would reduce welfare since the gain 
from the reduction in total damages is outweighed by the loss in market surplus due to the output 
restriction.  
